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Domestic Restrictions on Non-Governmental
Organizations and Potential Protections through Legal
Personality: Time for a Change?
Casey Jedele

Abstract
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a vital role in international law and
governance by influencing the formation of international law and serving as watchdogs in the
execution of international agreements. However, countries around the world are increasingly
wielding overly cumbersome and targeted domestic restrictions against NGOs in the form of both
formal legislation and executive policy. These restrictions hinder the ability of NGOs to provide
services, raise resources, and fulfill their watchdog role. As such, the restrictions threaten the
effectiveness and very existence of NGOs, especially in nations where they are most needed.
Evidence suggests that these ramifications are the design of such restrictions. NGOs are limited
in their ability to combat such domestic regulations, partially because they do not possess legal
personality in the international legal system. Legal personality is defined as the possession of
rights and duties by an entity that allow it to sue and be sued. While traditionally only states
possessed legal personality, international law has granted exceptions to this rule in a few areas of
jurisprudence. This Comment explores the rise in domestic restrictions on NGOs, the legal status
of NGOs under the current international regime, the influence of NGOs on international law,
and possibilities for NGOs to combat domestic regulations through legal personality. It argues,
given the rise of domestic restrictions over the past decade, that it is time for the international
system to grant NGOs legal personality and allow NGOs to sue nations that restrict their rights
contrary to commitments the nation has made in international agreements. While challenges to
legal personality persist, this Comment argues that the United Nations (U.N.) and regional
courts, such as the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, present potential avenues for
NGOs to attain and exercise legal personality.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
On July 15, 2019, Egypt’s parliament approved a draft law outlining new
restrictions on civil society organizations or non-governmental organizations
(NGOs).1 The law is an extension of the 2017 “Law 70” regulation which requires
registration for NGOs engaging in “civil work” and governmental permission for
various civil-society and human-rights-oriented activities.2 This draft law threatens
the ability of NGOs to serve as government watchdogs, foster a healthy civil
society, and protect human rights.3 Similarly stringent regulations have swept
across other nations, such as China and Russia, in recent years. For example,
China’s 2016 “Charity Law and Overseas NGO Law” grants government officials
broad discretion to crack down on the activities of international NGOs engaging
in civil society and humanitarian work.4 Intense documentation requirements
accompany this discretion to chill NGO activity.5
Regulations in Russia have been regarded as a catalyst and model for the
stringent regulations passed in many countries since these regulations went into
effect. Even after liberalizing Putin’s 2006 law, which gave the government
discretion to shut down NGOs for even minor clerical errors in their paperwork,
Russia maintains an aggressive approach to regulating NGOs. Further, the
Russian government continues to demonstrate significant hostility toward civil
society, “[p]articularly toward those [NGOs] perceived to be closely associated
with foreign support, expertise, or influence.”6
Uganda’s flavor of NGO regulation allows a regulating body the opportunity
to “blacklist” NGOs, but provides little information as to the qualifications for
blacklisting an organization or the results of a “blacklist” designation.7 Other

1

Law No. 149 of 2019 (The Law Governing Pursuit of Civil Work), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 19 Aug.
2019 (Egypt).

2

Law No. 70 of 2017 (Law Regulating Associations and Other Foundations Working in the Field of
Civil Work), al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyah, 24 May 2017 (Egypt).
Civic Freedom Monitor: Egypt, THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW (July 17,
2019), http://perma.cc/ARL9-PJDZ.
Charity Law of the People’s Republic of China, CHAIRMAN’S ORDER 12TH CONGRESS NO. 43,
http://perma.cc/4QDB-N6JH (official law), http://perma.cc/D6PF-J28N (unofficial English
translation).
Civic Freedom Monitor: China, THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW (Mar. 6,
2019), http://perma.cc/3EFW-VEVP.
Gary W. Jenkins, Nongovernmental Organizations and the Forces Against Them: Lessons of the AntiNgo Movement, 37 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 459, 507 (2012).
Hanibal Goitom, Uganda: Non-Governmental Organizations Bill Becomes Law, THE LAW LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS (Mar. 17, 2016), http://perma.cc/7DAX-MDDC.

3

4

5

6

7
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nations, such as India, have focused their regulation on cracking down on NGOs
accepting aid from foreign individuals, hamstringing the budgets of many NGOs.8
Domestic restrictions on NGOs are problematic from an international law
perspective because NGOs play a critical role in international governance and
have done so for 200 years. This role relies on the ability of NGOs to gather
information and carry out the promises of international human rights treaties
ratified by national governments.9 While pushback against international NGOs is
not new,10 the wave of domestic regulations has only increased over the last two
decades and does not show signs of stopping. One element of this pushback is
based on concerns about NGO accountability and transparency, especially in light
of recent scandals related to international NGOs such as the World Wildlife
Fund.11
Article 71 of the U.N. Charter serves as the legal basis for NGO activities in
international law and peacemaking. Specifically, Article 71 grants the U.N.
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) the power to assign NGOs consultative
status.12 This consultative status has elevated the role of NGOs in international
policymaking, especially in the realm of soft law, such as non-binding policy
declarations. However, scholars agree that NGOs have not been granted legal
personality, nor the ability to sue states in international courts.13 This has limited
the ability of NGOs to fight back against domestic restrictions on their activities.
While there is a wealth of research on the historical role NGOs have played in
international law,14 there is little research exploring international legal mechanisms
for NGOs to protect themselves against the recent tide of domestic restrictions
on activities and funding.
This Comment defines NGOs as private organizations, not established by a
government or intergovernmental agreement, that are not profit-seeking and
pursue interests across national borders.15 The Comment considers the reach of
8

9

10
11

12

13

14
15

Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Globalization Without a Safety Net: The Challenge of Protecting Cross-Border Funding
of NGOs, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1205 (2018).
Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 183 (1997).
Jenkins, supra note 6, at 494.
Lulu Garcia-Navarro, Buzzfeed News Investigation Finds World Wildlife Fund Backs Paramilitary Abuses,
NPR (Mar. 24, 2019), http://perma.cc/YF22-HQMP.
C. Alihusain, The Influence of NGOs on International Law, PEACE PALACE LIBRARY (Nov. 9, 2019)
(internal citations omitted) http://perma.cc/JZ7U-9EBP.
See Rephael Ben-Ari, The International Legal Status of International Non-Governmental Organizations: The
Century-Long Normative Debate and its Future Prospects, 23 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 13 (2014).
Id. at 5–31.
I derived this definition from multiple sources. See Alihusain, supra note 12, (defining NGOs as
“groups of persons or of societies, freely created by private initiative, that pursue an interest in
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Article 71, the benefits and disadvantages of legal personality in international
courts, and the potential for NGOs to find protection from domestic restrictions
through a renewed push for legal personality. Although this would be a significant
shift in international law, the recent rise in restrictions and the longstanding
movement for legal personality combine to create the perfect storm to support
greater legal rights for NGOs. Further, technological advances and expanded
international accountability mechanisms may mitigate state hesitance in the
movement for legal personality.
The Comment begins with a discussion of current domestic regulations on
NGOs, particularly as they conflict with binding international commitments states
have made regarding civil society and human rights. The Comment then turns to
the legal status of NGOs in international law, focusing on the U.N. Charter.
However, the bulk of the Comment explores the potential use of legal personality
to grant NGOs greater power to protect themselves from stifling regulation that
hurts the enforceability and legitimacy of international law as a whole. The
Comment also considers the ability of legal personality to increase accountability
amongst NGOs. Finally, the Comment examines potential solutions through both
the U.N. and regional instruments such as the African Court of Human and
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).

II. L ANDSCAPE OF R ESTRICTIONS ON NGO S
In the two years preceding 2019 alone, forty pieces of legislation “designed
to hamper the work of civil society organizations” have been enacted or debated
around the world.16 Similarly, from 2014 to 2018, over sixty countries passed or
drafted laws that hamstring NGO operations.17 Ninety-six countries have
implemented non-legislative policies in the same vein.18 The legislation and
policies that have swept across nations share common threads: cumbersome

16

17

18

matters that occur or transcend national borders and are not profit seeking”); Charnovitz, Two
Centuries of Participation, supra note 9, at 186 (citing the International Law Dictionary in defining an NGO
as a “private international organization that serves as a mechanism for cooperation among private
national groups in international affairs”); Hermann H.K. Rechenberg, Non-Governmental
Organizations, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 276 (1986) (defining NGOs as
“private organizations not established by a government or by intergovernmental agreement which
are capable of playing a role in international affairs by virtue of their activities”).
Global Assault on NGOs Reaches Crisis Point as New Laws Curb Vital Human Rights Work, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL (Feb. 21, 2019), http://perma.cc/EE2H-5MN6.
Jacqueline Van De Velde, The “Foreign Agent Problem”: An International Legal Solution to Domestic
Restrictions on Non-Governmental Organizations, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 687, 691 (2018).
Id.
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registration processes, elaborate monitoring schemes, and efforts to shut down
NGOs that make even trivial errors in funding requirement compliance.19
Just as the legislation is similar across nations, so too is the rhetoric used to
justify restrictions on NGO activity. Some justifications commonly used include
“prevention of foreign interference within domestic politics; protecting national
security; increasing accountability; and ensuring states’ sovereign right to pass such
legislation.”20 Further, some believe that the rise of restrictions on NGOs has
targeted organizations that “defend the rights of marginalized groups,” such as
NGOs focused on women’s rights, LGBT rights, immigrant rights, and
environmental protection.21

A. Regulations in Russia
Restrictions on NGOs by the Russian government have become a model
that other countries emulate.22 Since the Russian policies began in the early 2000s,
other countries have drafted and passed legislation to stifle NGO activities. For
example, “Azerbaijan, Mexico, Pakistan, Sudan, Uzbekistan, and Hungary [ ] have
each created remarkably similar restraints,” and another dozen states hope to
implement similar legislation in the coming months and years.23
It is important to note that NGO restrictions have not eliminated civil
society in Russia. In fact, Russia has “an active civil society with more than 220,000
noncommercial organizations and public associations.”24 However, the Russian
regulations grant the national government leeway in shaping the makeup of civil
society within its borders for various policy reasons, including a desire to limit
foreign influence in domestic affairs.
Putin’s 2006 NGO Law introduced “new registration procedures and stricter
monitoring of NGO activities, financial contributions, and budgets.”25 One
statutory requirement for NGOs found in the 2006 law “required organizations
to fill out approximately one hundred pages of documents, listing detailed
personal information about each founder and each member. A single mistake or
misstep in the paperwork could serve as ‘grounds for denial of registration’”26 As
one might imagine, such cumbersome regulations, coupled with the threat of a
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Amnesty International, supra note 16.
Van De Velde, supra note 17, at 706.
Amnesty International, supra note 16.
Id. (arguing that the Russian regulations have led created a “ripple effect”).
Van De Velde, supra note 17, at 692.
Jenkins, supra note 6, at 504.
Id. at 504 (internal citation omitted).
Id.
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prompt shut down, disincentivizes NGOs from opening Russian offices. In 2009,
President Medvedev amended the regulation and removed some of the more
“draconian elements.”27 For example, incomplete registrations no longer result in
automatic denial of the NGO from Russian civil society, although the law still grants
the government significant discretion in oversight of NGOs. 28 Because of this
discretion and the remaining stringent procedural requirements for NGOs, the
regulations remain powerful; in 2015, the MacArthur Foundation announced it
was closing its Moscow office after twenty-five years due to the rigorous
regulations that made its work impossible.29 Because the foundation was “foreignfunded,” it had been formally designated as “undesirable” by the Russian
government.30

B. Regulations in China
In 2016, President Xi Jinping passed restrictive legislation curtailing the
activities of NGOs in China. Like the Russian laws, the Chinese regulations
impose strict monitoring and registration processes. First, under the regulations,
NGOs may not fundraise, conduct political activities, or operate without
registering with the police.31 Second, all foreign NGOs must secure a Chinese
sponsor organization.32 Third, law enforcement has the ability to
shut down NGO events, examine their offices and finances, and question their
staff at any time.33
The Chinese media justified the stringent regulations in the name of national
security and protection from foreign interference within China’s borders.34 When
discussing the regulations, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry noted that they
create “a highly uncertain and potentially hostile environment for foreign nonprofit, non-governmental organizations and their Chinese partners that will no
doubt discourage activities and initiatives.”35 According to the Civic Freedom
Monitor, the regulations are part of a larger effort to promote “a civil society with
Chinese characteristics” in opposition to what the Chinese government sees as
27

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Id. at 505–06 (“In the spring of 2009, after meeting with NGO leaders and hearing their complaints,
President Medvedev promised to review Russia’s NGO law, stating that ‘improvements to NGO
legislation were possible and also necessary.’”).
Id. at 505–06.
Hitoshi Mayer, supra note 8, at 1205–06.
Id. at 1205.
Van De Velde, supra note 17, at 689.
Id.
Id. at 689–90.
Id. at 690.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
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Western values imposed by international NGOs.36 Despite domestic and
international outcry regarding the regulations, the Chinese legislature maintained
that the law would actually serve to guarantee NGO rights and make their
operations more efficient.37
The law itself, however, is only one barrier to NGOs. Delayed and chaotic
implementation of the law presents a second challenge. Although the law required
NGOs to comply by January 1, 2017, the government did not release the list of
acceptable sponsor organizations until December 20, 2016.38 The Chinese officials
were clear that, despite the extremely truncated timeline for NGOs to secure a
sponsor, there would be no “grace period” for NGOs already operating in the
country.39 The delayed implementation of the law, coupled with its strict
enforcement, led the American Bar Association (ABA), to shut down its Beijing
Office.40 The organization operated legal training programs and sought to
promote the rule of law in China.41

C. Regulations in African Nations
While this Comment will not examine in detail the variety of NGO
regulations passed in African countries, African countries play an important role
in understanding the landscape of domestic restrictions on NGO activities for two
key reasons. First, regulations on NGOs have swept across much of Africa. At
the same time, NGOs play a prominent role in international lawmaking and
enforcement in Africa. Over the last fifteen years, twelve African countries have
adopted legislation or polices that constrain NGOs.42 These countries consist of:
Sudan, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Zambia, Tunisia, Algeria, South Sudan, Uganda, Sierra
Leone, Egypt, Burundi, and Tanzania.43 Further, six additional countries had antiNGO measures pending as of May 2019.44 Six other countries have considered
regulations, but the legislation was either defeated or abandoned in the legislature,
or even rejected by the courts.45 Just as many believe nations have learned from
36
37
38

39
40
41
42

43
44
45

Civic Freedom Monitor: China, supra note 5.
Van De Velde, supra note 17, at 690.
Zheping Huang, NGOs Are Under Threat in China’s Latest Crackdown Against “Foreign Forces,” QUARTZ
(Jan. 4, 2017), http://perma.cc/VSW7-B42L.
Id.
Id.
Id.
GODFREY M. MUSILA, FREEDOMS UNDER THREAT: THE SPREAD OF ANTI-NGO MEASURES IN
AFRICA 3 (2019).
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 16.
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the Russian and Chinese restrictions on NGOs, there is also a strong presumption
of “cross-border learning” in Africa.46
One example of restrictive NGO legislation in an African nation is Uganda’s
2016 Non-Governmental Organizations Bill.47 The law creates an NGO
regulatory body that maintains a registry and is responsible for renewing or
denying renewal of NGO permits. The agency has the power to “blacklist”
NGOs, but the legislation fails to provide a comprehensive definition of what
“blacklisting” entails or what may lead to a “blacklist” designation.48 As such, the
regulatory body possesses a worrying amount of discretionary leeway to close
down an NGO, thus threatening civil society in Uganda.
Another example of NGO legislation in Africa is Egypt’s ongoing fight
against foreign funding. In the years following the Arab Spring in Egypt, the
government cracked down on civil society:
A criminal case launched in 2011, focused on Egypt-based international
organizations alleged to have received foreign funding without government
permission, was reopened and expanded in 2016 to focus on Egyptian
organizations. From 2016 through 2019, a number of Egypt’s most
prominent civil society leaders have been banned from travel in connection
with the case, and several had their personal and organizational assets frozen
under court order. Others have been detained and interrogated.49

Further, in 2014, the nation amended Article 78 of its criminal code to heighten
the penalties for the receipt of foreign funding with intent to harm the national
interest or public peace and expand the scope of illegal activity.50 In 2017, Egypt’s
Law 70 enacted significant restraints on NGO “formation, funding, activities,
contact with international entities, and internal governance, and imposed severe
criminal penalties on CSOs for violations.”51 In August of 2019, Egypt published
a new law meant to replace and relax Law 70. However, the new law does little to
change the overarching regulatory approach to NGOs in Egypt.52 It remains to be
seen whether the enforcement of the new law may provide NGOs more breathing
room.
The second reason that restrictions in African nations are particularly
relevant is that the ACHPR provides jurisdiction for NGOs to bring suits against
signatory nations.53 While this Comment discusses this grant of legal personality
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Id. at 16–17.
The Non-Governmental Organisations Act (2017), http://perma.cc/GN98-UAC6.
Goitom, supra note 7.
Civic Freedom Monitor: Egypt, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Oliver Windridge, The Importance of ‘Observer Status’ for NGOs, THE ACTHPR MONITOR (Jan. 15,
2014), http://perma.cc/JSH7-YVFW.
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in greater detail, it is worth noting now that the mechanism of the ACHPR has
not yet stymied anti-NGO restrictions. This raises questions for the limits and
potential of legal personality as a solution to restrictive domestic regulations on
NGOs.

III. T HE L EGAL S TATUS OF NGO S
This Section will explore the legal status of NGOs under international law,
drawing from recent legal literature on the subject. The Section will address the
U.N. Charter, the ECOSOC Rules, and the historical movement for legal
personality for NGOs over the past 100 years. NGOs are defined as private
organizations, not established by a government or intergovernmental agreement,
that are not profit-seeking and that pursue interests across national borders.54
While there exists a wealth of definitions for NGOs across legal literature and
government documents, this definition captures the international focus of NGOs
relevant to this Comment as well as the independence inherent in NGOs’ status
under international law.

A. Basic Legal Status of NGOs in the International Legal
System
The Charter of the United Nations was signed on June 26, 1945 at the
conclusion of the U.N. Conference on International Organization.55 Because there
is no black letter “international NGO law,” Article 71 of the U.N. Charter is often
seen as the basis of NGOs’ official activities within the international sphere.
Article 71 states that
The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for
consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with
matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with
international organizations and, where appropriate, with national
organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations
concerned.56

This language established the consultative status of NGOs with the ECOSOC.
This consultative status is not equivalent to legal personality as it does not grant
NGOs standing to bring cases before a court such as the International Court of
Justice. However, the consultative status Article 71 articulated remains a
fundamental grant of legitimacy to NGOs in the international legal system. The
ECOSOC rules shape the nuts and bolts of consultative status.
54
55
56

I derived this definition from multiple sources. See Section I, n.15.
U.N. Charter.
Id. at art. 71.
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There are three categories of consultative NGO status in the U.N. First,
“general” status is reserved for NGOs that are “concerned with most of
ECOSOC’s activities, that can demonstrate sustained contributions to the
achievement of U.N. objectives, and that are broadly representative of major
segments of population in a large number of countries.”57 Second, “special” status
is for those NGOs that are “concerned with a few fields covered by ECOSOC
and that are known internationally within these fields.”58 Third, “roster” status is
reserved for those NGOs that “can make occasional useful contributions to U.N.
bodies.”59 As one might imagine, NGOs with “general” status have the most
comprehensive rights within the U.N. structure and may “propose items for the
provisional agenda of ECOSOC, attend public meetings as observers, submit
written statements, and request opportunities to make oral presentations.”60 As of
September 2018, 5,161 NGOs enjoy consultative status within one of these three
designations with ECOSOC.61
Since 1996, Current Resolution 1996/31 has largely governed the consultative
relationship of NGOs with ECOSOC. This resolution requires NGOs to fulfill
criteria such as “having an established headquarters, an executive organ and
officer, a democratically-adopted constitution (providing for the determination of
policy by a representative body), an authority to speak for the members, and
financial independence from governmental bodies.”62 While the consultative
status established by the U.N. Charter did not initially extend to the U.N. Security
Council, NGOs were granted access to the Council in 1997, at which point NGOs
began holding briefings with council members. In 2004, “the U.N. Security
Council engaged in direct consultations with NGOs regarding the role of civil
society in post-conflict peacebuilding.”63
In the decades since the signing of the U.N. Charter, ECOSOC has
“considerably expanded the scope of Article 71, by adopting authoritative

57
58
59
60

61

62

63

Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation, supra note 9, at 267.
Id.
Id.
Id. Beyond these three main NGO statuses, “three NGOs have U.N. observer status: the ICRC,
the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the Sovereign Order
of Malta.”
Basic Facts About ECOSOC Status, UNITED NATIONS NGO BRANCH: DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, http://perma.cc/8Y48-MTTA.
Kerstin Martens, Examining the (Non-)Status of NGOs in International Law, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 1, 16–17 (2003) (also noting that NGOs are required to fulfill more vague criteria beyond
these more specific qualifications such as “international standing,” “independent governance,” and
“geographical affiliation”).
Alihusain, supra note 12.
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interpretations thereof, and by reviewing and modifying its Rules of Procedure.”64
Namely, the consultative status has become known to (1) “enable ECOSOC and
its bodies to obtain expert information and advice” and (2) “provide a forum for
the participation of [international NGOs], which represent important elements of
public opinion in a large number of countries.”65 Despite this expanded scope,
consultative status remains fundamentally limited by the fact that it is the
governments that decide on NGO applications and these “decisions on
admission, classification, suspension or withdrawal of an INGO, taken by
ECOSOC’s committee on NGOs, are highly motivated by political
considerations.”66
Importantly, consultative status does not equate to legal personality and
[a]s a result, NGOs are obliged to accept the national legislation of the state
in which they have been established and where they are based. In the Western
world, the right to societal organization can be linked back to basic civil rights
such as freedom of association and freedom of speech. National laws differ,
however, from country to country, and therefore NGO status also varies.67

Professor Ben-Ari, Bar-Ilan University Law Faculty, outlined current and previous
attempts to acquire formal legal status for NGOs and noted:
In any case, it is generally acknowledged that granting consultative status to
an INGO does not mean, conjointly, the transfer of rights, immunities and
privileges of a member of ECOSOC or the [U.N.] to that organization.
Nevertheless, some claim that if an INGO is granted consultative status by
an IGO, it simultaneously acquires “a certain international legal status, albeit not
that of a subject of international law.” The essence of “status” short of
personality remains, however, peculiar and blurred. Certainly, one may not
conclude that the mere enjoyment of a consultative (or observer) status
corresponds to the acquisition of ILP.68

Yet, despite the general acknowledgement that consultative status does not equate
to legal personality, the impact of the U.N. Charter on the legal status of NGOs
should not be overlooked.
Article 71 has served as a model and springboard for other international
organizations to establish strong relationships with NGOs, including granting
them legal personality. Notably, the African Court for Human and Peoples’ Rights
allows NGOs with “observer” status before the African Union to bring cases

64
65
66
67
68

Ben-Ari, supra note 13, at 12.
Id.
Id.
Martens, supra note 62, at 21.
Ben-Ari, supra note 13, at 13 (emphasis in original).
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directly before the Court.69 Further, the Organization of American States (OAS)
adopted The Guidelines for the Participation of Civil Society Organizations in OAS Activities
in 1999, which provides a scope of participation by NGOs within the OAS similar
to that found in the U.N.’s ECOSOC.70 Finally, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe took the U.N.’s Article 71 and consultative status scheme
as a “model for their relationship to non-governmental actors.”71

B. The Historical Movement for Legal Personality
To further understand the current status of NGOs in the international legal
sphere and to explore the possibilities for legal personality for NGOs in the years
to come, it is critical to understand that discussion of legal personality for NGOs
is not new. In fact, there has been a “formal movement” for legal personality for
NGOs for over 100 years.
In 1910, the Union of International Associations (UIA) hosted the First
World Congress of International Associations. At the Congress, the UIA became
the first organization to propose establishing a “super-national status” for NGOs
through diplomatic convention.72 That same year, the International Law
Association adopted a similar resolution in favor of legal status for NGOs. These
steps became the catalyst for the Institute of International Law’s 1912 Institute
Proposal which would allow state signatories to grant international associations like
NGOs legal personality. While the Proposal was a major step for the movement,
it was too simple and failed to thoroughly consider the structure of legal
personality for NGOs as well as the implications of granting NGOs legal
personality in terms of their relationships with states.73 No states signed onto the
proposal. Thus, it floundered and was consequently abandoned.
In 1923, the movement gained new life through a 1923 Institute Proposal with
intentions for the following: “to grant international associations ‘an international
status which is compatible with the requirement of public order’” and to ensure
that “associations ‘be at liberty not to have exclusive ties with any given
country.’”74 The proposal included a system by which states would grant legal
protection to international associations, which would be organized into an
international registry. This plan, like the 1912 Institute Proposal, died out when
69

70
71
72
73
74

See generally Abdelsalam A. Mohamed, Individual and NGO Participation in Human Rights Litigation Before
the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights: Lessons from the European and Inter-American Courts of
Human Rights, 8 MICH. ST. U.-DCL J. INT’L L. 377 (1999).
Alihusain, supra note 12.
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enthusiasm fizzled and the world became embroiled in World War II.75 Both the
1912 and 1923 Institute of International Law proposals were flawed in failing to
address the mechanisms required for an international registry of NGOs, as well
as incentives to induce states to sign on to such a proposal.76
The next step in the international movement for NGO legal status was the
U.N. Charter of 1949 and Article 71, discussed in more detail above. While some
hoped that Article 71 would be just one step toward expanded legal status for
NGOs, the optimism was met with disappointment, as the U.N. did not take
additional steps to grant legal personality beyond the consultative status of Article
71. For others, Article 71 served as an immediate disappointment due to the
subject matter limitations on NGOs:
Although most of the NGO participation under the League had occurred on
economic or social issues, there had also been involvement in mandates and
disarmament issues. Yet, Article 71 did not go beyond Economic and Social
Council. Indeed, [the Secretary of the Federation of Private International
Organizations] viewed Article 71 as “a so-far-and-no-further obstacle to any
continuance of the pragmatic but close IGO-NGO partnership developed
under the League [of Nations].77

The 1950 and 1959 proposals by the Institute of International Law and the
UIA, respectively, illustrate a focus on developing both a coherent definition of
NGOs and an international agency that could run such a registry and enforce
standards among the organizations.78 While the focus of these two proposals was
not on legal personality, both documents sought to improve legitimacy by
ensuring proper standards of NGO activities across the world.79 In particular, the
1959 proposal emphasized that NGOs were often impeded by “administrative
difficulties” and that an international registry could overcome some of these
difficulties by maintaining standards among NGOs and lobbying for benefits of
NGOs from the nations in which they were operating.80 Again, while portions of
the NGO community initially met both proposals with enthusiasm, neither
developed sufficient traction to go through a formal approval process.
This series of failed proposals was largely supported by NGOs themselves
rather than the international community at large, and the cumulative failures
culminated in a shift toward regional treaties and away from a conference that
would provide for, or at least consider, international legal personality for NGOs
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on a global level. For example, the 1986 European Convention on the Recognition
of the Legal Personality of International NGOs “recognizes a national legal
personality, obtained within any state party, as having equal effect in another state
party” for NGOs.81 This designation grew out of the 1983 Report on INGOs and
Their Legal Status (“Merle Report”), which was submitted to the Council of Europe
to support that body’s consideration of the legal status of NGOs.82 The Merle
Report concluded that the intellectual and political environment of Europe
provided fertile ground for progress in the realm NGO status.83 Despite this
optimistic conclusion, the Merle Report acknowledged that states would likely
continue to be disinclined to grant NGOs international legal personality out of
fear that doing so would threaten the states’ authority. The Report argued that this
mistrust would probably lead to the adoption of a regional status for NGOs that
remained at the discretion of the states.84 The Report’s conclusions and
observations remain salient today. Just as in the 1980s, states remain wary of
granting NGOs status that might threaten or usurp state power or allow NGOs
to engage in activities that they believe will threaten national security.
In the 21st century, conversations surrounding the legal status of NGOs
remain regionally focused and, similar to the proposals of the 1950s, concerned
with accountability and international standards for NGOs. In 2006, eleven NGOs
endorsed the NGO Accountability Charter. The charter was “heralded by its
founders as the first international, cross-sectoral code of conduct for NGOs and
thus an ‘unprecedent[ed] step.’”85 While the NGO Accountability Charter clearly
represents only a very minor fraction of the NGO community, it is a positive
example of NGOs using accountability to seek legitimacy in the realm of
international law. Importantly, the NGO Accountability Charter requires
members to report operations and funding information to a central tool on an
annual basis in order to promote oversight.86 It therefore is a small-scale
realization of the reporting elements of the proposals of the 20th century.
In the same theme of accountability, the International Bar Association’s
Human Rights Institute, in conjunction with the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, launched the Lund-London Guidelines in
2009. These guidelines aimed to produce international standards of good practice
for NGOs to improve “accuracy, transparency, and credibility.”87 While the
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guidelines do not directly advocate or require particular legal rights or obligations
for NGOs, the focus on legitimacy and accountability for NGOs addresses one
of the most stubborn hurdles to NGO legal personality both historically and
today.
Finally, the 2010 International Law Association’s Report on NGOs provides
a more ambitious and creative approach to legal personality than the International
Law Association has communicated in decades. Namely, the Report “employs
Article 71 of the [U.N.] Charter as a starting point for constructing a theory of
kinds of [Non State Actor] legal status.”88 The Report also commends the 1986
European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of
International NGOs as the best example of states bestowing legal status to NGOs
through a treaty.89

IV. I NFLUENCE OF NGO S
If NGOs did not serve such an integral role in the international sphere, it
would be difficult to advocate for legal personality. However, because NGOs’
rights and duties have a significant impact on international law, they should enjoy
legal personality status. NGOs play a critical role in the health of the international
system as a whole, in addition to their commonly recognized role in providing
direct aid to communities in need. NGOs are numerous, continue to have an
increasingly influential role in international legal affairs, and operate in both formal
and informal capacities.
NGOs are numerous, and their participation in global affairs has increased
substantially over the last century, with their influence reaching virtually every
subject of international law. The UIA reports that the number of NGOs has
increased from 176 in 1909 to 5,936 in 2002.90 As previously mentioned, 5,161
NGOs enjoy consultative status with ECOSOC.91 Within the general category of
NGOs, approximately one quarter of organizations are human rights focused.92
Further, NGOs do not limit their focus to domestic affairs. In fact, “[m]ore than
840 NGOs participated in the Vienna Conference on Human Rights in 1993” and
“around 1,400 NGOs took part in the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992.”93 At the
Earth Summit, NGOs served as members within government delegations and in
88
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advisory roles.94 In 2017, 2,133 NGOs were admitted to the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change.95
Over the past fifty years in particular, international NGOs have seen their
influential role increase substantially. Kerstin Martins, Associate Professor of
International Relations at the University of Bremen, Germany, writing in the
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, argues that:
since the end of the Cold War, NGOs have enjoyed increasingly easy access
to, and better possibilities to affect, political processes taking place above the
national level. In fact, the increasing intensity of their activities over the last
decade demonstrates that they have become an integral part of the procedures
and structures of global governance.96

The widespread and increasing influence of NGOs has been recognized as
a unique development within the international legal system. The former President
of the International Court of Justice, Rosalyn Higgins, has stated that NGO
demands on the international legal system represent “one phenomenon in the
reformation in international law. . . . An aspect of that reformation is a change in
the concept of international law, and in particular, in our notions of the identity
of the users and beneficiaries of international law.”97 Much of NGO influence on
international law can be categorized as soft law. Indeed, “campaigning,
mobilization, advocacy, lobbying, agenda-setting, and negotiation” are “widely
acknowledged” as effective forms of NGO influence in the realm of international
law.98
Although the recent role of NGOs in international governance is quite
notable, it would be a mistake to regard NGO influence as a modern
phenomenon. Just as a movement for legal personality for NGOs has existed for
over 100 years, NGOs themselves have been involved in international governance
for over 200 years.99 As such, the history of NGOs illustrates “a longtime custom
of governmental interaction with NGOs in the making of international policy.”100
The reasons for the recent rise in NGO activity are varied. Professor Steve
Charnovitz, Associate Professor at the George Washington University Law
School, in the Michigan Journal of International Law, offered four reasons as to why
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NGOs have been more active in international policy since the 1990s than in the
decades before:
First, the integration of the world economy and the increasing recognition of
global problems have led to more intergovernmental negotiations that affect
domestic policy. Second, the cessation of the Cold War ended the superpower
polarization in world politics. Third, the emergence of a worldwide media,
such as CNN International, provides opportunities for NGOs to publicize
their views. Fourth, the spread of democratic norms has raised expectations
about the transparency of international organizations and the opportunities
they provide for public participation.101

President Bill Clinton, when discussing the rise of NGO activities, focused on the
importance of charitable giving and public exposure to NGOs. He highlighted the
“vast pool of new wealth available for giving, and the rising influence of small
donors” as important factors in the growth of the role NGOs play in civil
society.102
The marked increase in NGO activity in shaping international law has raised
difficult questions about accountability and legitimacy for NGOs. Professor BenAri argues that although NGOs “have become a source of power and legitimacy
in world politics . . . being unelected, unaccountable, and unrepresentative . . .
raises difficult questions of legality and legitimacy.”103
NGOs also play an important role as watchdogs within the borders of states
who have made international commitments, especially in the area of human rights.
This role is less formal than, for example, being granted legal status by
international commissions104 or filing amicus briefs with international tribunals.105
Because of this lack of formality, the impact of this role is difficult to quantify and
study. However, “Oscar Schachter, a keen observer, detected this [role of review
of state compliance with international obligations] in 1960, and in the following
decades, the NGO role flowered in the monitoring of human rights, humanitarian,
and environmental law.”106 The “watchdog” role serves a complementary function
to NGOs’ formalized influence in the creation of international law. In particular,
“[o]nce international norms have legal effect, NGOs . . . ensure that these norms
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are applied in accordance with the spirit in which they were negotiated, or that
they are interpreted in a way that is favorable to the enforcement of legal rights.”107
It is this “watchdog” role that is particularly threatened by the rising tide of
domestic restrictions on NGOs. For example, when the MacArthur Foundation
closed its Russian office in 2015, its main areas of focus were in higher education
and human rights.108 The Foundation worked for progress in these areas both
directly and through grants to other NGOs. In its human rights work, the
Foundation promoted access to the European Court of Human Rights.109 Thus,
the Foundation was both directly and indirectly encouraging Russian citizens to
hold their government accountable to the human rights commitments it made on
an international level. While many NGOs focused on human rights and other
subject areas remain active in Russia, the story of the MacArthur Foundation is
one example of how domestic regulation can directly inhibit NGOs from
performing their crucial “watchdog” function internationally.

V. P OSSIBILITIES FOR L EGAL P ERSONALITY
This Section argues that, given the rise of domestic restrictions that prevent
NGOs from fulfilling their vital functions within the international legal system, it
is time for the system to grant NGOs legal personality—the right to sue and be
sued. NGOs with legal personality status could then take nations to court for (a)
restricting their rights as NGOs, or (b) not abiding by commitments the nation
has made in their international agreements. This Comment has not set out to
provide a comprehensive system that would grant legal personality for NGOs.
Further, legal personality is not the end-all solution for NGOs seeking to fight
restrictive national legislation. Instead, this Comment addresses the benefits of
granting NGOs legal personality and the subsequent issues such status may create.
Legal personality grants NGOs the ability to sue and be sued, but legal instruments
create rights and duties that form the basis for causes of action that can be brought
on behalf of or against NGOs. Legal personality is the crucial first step towards a
comprehensive international legal system that encourages NGOs to act as
independent entities before various tribunals. Thus, this Section explores potential
solutions within the U.N. structure and lessons from the ACHPR to consider the
feasibility and attractiveness of using legal personality as a weapon against
domestic restrictions on NGOs.
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A. The Importance of Legal Personality
Legal personality status is critical to NGOs because it is the only way for
them to bring affirmative claims in international courts on their own behalf,
without relying on states or individuals. If an NGO hopes to combat its host
state’s domestic restrictions, for example, it is unlikely that the state that imposed
those restrictions will bring the NGO’s claims to court for it.
According to Professor Ben-Ari, legal personality would serve two interests.
First, legal personality would assist in confining the number of NGOs and would
allow institutions to “monitor[ ] and scrutiniz[e] their activity, thereby improving
their proficiency and responsible advocacy.”110 Proponents of confining the
growth of NGOs argue that the proliferation of NGOs has created inefficiency
and threatened their legitimacy. Second, legal personality would facilitate NGO
activities through the provision of rights, privileges, and immunities that they can
use to protect their operations. Under this line of reasoning, legal personality for
NGOs would create a “fairer international legal order that would reflect the
position and relevance of all significant international actors, including [NGOs],
thereby legitimizing their voice and ensuring their participation.”111
Of course, both of these interests are based on the underlying assumption
that NGOs play an important and legitimate role in international law, as Section
IV of this Comment suggests. Legal literature supports this argument. For
example, Professor Bosire Maragia, University of Maryland, Baltimore County has
argued that NGOs are “increasingly becoming legitimate actors contrary to
traditional theories of international law and international relations.”112 Maragia
goes on to argue that NGOs may even be acquiring international legal personality
implicitly.113 According to Maragia, NGOs have gained legitimacy, because they
“have been recognized in international legal documents that accord them certain
rights; states are increasingly co-opting NGOs as partners in development; and
NGOs have been very active in the development and . . . enforcement of
international law especially in the environmental, human rights and trade areas.”114
While this Comment does not argue that NGOs have acquired international legal
personality implicitly, it does argue that the legitimacy of NGO activity in
international law has been recognized to an extent that the next logical step for
NGOs is to acquire legal personality so as to protect their current status, and the
110
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benefits to the international system that flow from it, from intervention by state
actors.
While traditionally only states have been granted legal personality, it would
not be unprecedented for legal personality to extend beyond nations in the
international legal sphere. For example, in human rights litigation, multiple
international tribunals have granted individuals the right to sue on their own behalf:
the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights both allow individuals
to bring cases before the court, either directly or indirectly.115 Further, the World
Bank Inspection Panel allows private parties to submit complaints against
organizations.116 Conversely, the ICC prosecutes individuals who have committed
crimes against humanity, among other things.117 Given the extension of legal
personality to individuals across multiple international tribunals, legal personality
for NGOs appears feasible. While individuals are distinct from NGOs, both
possess rights under domestic and international law that are often minimized in
international tribunals that grant legal personality only to nations.

B. Potential within the U.N.
The most impactful form of legal personality would likely be recognition by
the U.N. of a right of NGOs to sue state actors. This would be significant because
of the central role of the U.N. in international governance, the wealth of
commitments that state actors have made through U.N. treaties that could be
vehicles for causes of actions brought by NGOs, and the role the U.N. plays in
setting the stage for legal rights in other intergovernmental organizations. Because
it is the U.N. that took the critical step forward in granting NGOs consultative
status through Article 71, it is natural for the U.N. to be the first body to take the
step of granting them legal personality as well.
Since ratification of the U.N. Charter, the 1996 ECOSOC regulations, and
the opening of the U.N. to national NGOs in 1996, the number of NGOs
recognized by the U.N. has increased substantially. The critical role of NGOs in
ECOSOC is undeniable, and therefore legal personality should be granted
through ECOSOC as a starting point for the international system. Doing so might
appease both state actors that seek oversight of NGO activities and NGOs that
seek to protect themselves from domestic restrictions that damage civil society.
A small step towards legal personality within ECOSOC, such as a grant of
power to NGOs to bring grievances about domestic regulations to the committee,
115
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may also assuage the fears of NGOs that “see the entrance door to the U.N.
closing and not opening before their eyes,” given that some members of
ECOSOC’s NGO Committee have been accused of carrying out unfriendly policy
against NGOs.118
One step toward legal personality would be granting NGOs the right to
bring grievances about domestic restrictions imposed by U.N. member states, at
least to the ECOSOC committee at large, if not in front of an international court
such as the International Court of Justice. ECOSOC could amend its rules of
procedure to create a forum for NGOs to bring grievances, but this would of
course be challenging, given the presence of powerful authoritarian countries in
ECOSOC that have proved unwilling to expand consultative status NGOs in the
past. To allow NGOs to bring grievances to the General Assembly would likely
require an amendment to the U.N. Charter itself. Article 108 of the U.N. Charter
clarifies that amendments must be adopted by two thirds of the General Assembly
and ratified by two thirds of member nations, “including all . . . permanent
members of the Security Council.”119 As one might expect, this is an extremely
difficult process. Such a step would likely only be possible if regional institutions
had shown great success in granting legal personality to NGOs, thus prompting
the U.N. to do so as well.
A second avenue for creating legal personality would be to grant NGOs
consultative relations beyond ECOSOC, to the General Assembly. This would
authorize NGO activity within the general organ of the U.N. and would be a step
toward legitimacy required for legal status. Steps by the U.N. such as these could
also be seen as steps toward creating legal personality implicitly through customary
law, as Maragia argues.120 While the amendment process would likely be required
for this change as well, it would probably be a less controversial amendment to
pursue.
Partnership between the UIA and the U.N. could provide support for
granting NGOs legal personality as well. The UIA is a nonprofit and apolitical
organization that provides criteria for NGOs and hosts an international NGO
database. The organization currently purports to offer detailed information on
40,300 organizations.121 The criteria relate to the “aims, membership, governance,
and financing” of international NGOs. The UIA also demands that the “aim of
118
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[an NGO] be genuinely international in character” to qualify for its registry.122
Partnering with such an organization could calm fears that the international
system would be flooded with organizations newly possessing legal personality
but lacking in sophistication or “international-ness.” In other words, the U.N.
could use the criteria and registry of the UIA or adopt criteria and a registry using
its own mechanisms to ensure legal personality was granted only to NGOs that
play a legitimate role in the international system. This would be one way to
overcome the failures of twentieth-century proposals which overlooked the
importance of an administrative body to serve as a gatekeeper to legal personality,
ensuring that only legitimate NGOs would receive legal rights in the international
system.
Rather than taking small steps toward legal personality through ECOSOC,
Professor Van De Velde has argued for realizing legal personality for NGOs
through the specific mechanism of Article 41 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).123 Van de Velde argues that state commitments
made under the ICCPR conflict with the domestic NGO restrictions passed by
nations in recent years, and that the ICCPR most directly addresses the
importance of NGOs in civil society and international governance.124 This is
another way for NGOs to take advantage of their preexisting status within the
international system to gain universal legal personality. However, it is worth noting
that the mechanism recommended, Article 41, has not been used to date.125

C. The African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights: A
Regional Solution
The ACHPR offers a regional solution to the problem posed by anti-NGO
legislation for NGOs operating in Africa. Critically, the instrument that created
the court, Article 1 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
122
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also granted NGOs legal rights and remedies and the court jurisdiction to hear
complaints from NGOs.126 Thus, the instrument combines legal personality with
complementary rights, duties, and jurisdiction to provide for a comprehensive
system under which NGOs can protect themselves. Because legal personality is
only as effective as the rights, remedies, and jurisdiction under which an entity can
bring cases, the court is an example of a well-rounded approach to legal
personality for NGOs.
The ACHPR grants observer status to NGOs based on an application
process conducted in front of a commission prior to and separate from any filings
with the court.127 In general, to attain observer status, an NGO must “(i) have
objectives and activities in consonance with the fundamental principles and
objectives enunciated in the OAU Charter and in the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights; (ii) be organisations working in the field of human rights; and
(iii) declare their financial resources.”128 Article 6(1) of the Protocol also allows the
court to grant NGOs observer status “to institute directly before it urgent cases
or serious, systematic or massive violations of human rights.”129 In other words,
when an NGO has been granted “observer status” it also attains at least partial
legal personality within the ACHPR.130
Importantly, Article 6(1) allows NGOs to bring cases against only those
states that have signed on to the Protocol. Because of this added layer to legal
personality, the mechanism is currently limited to nine state signatories: Benin,
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Tanzania, and
Republic of Tunisia.131 There have been twelve applications by NGOs to make a
claim before the court against a state that has signed the optional protocol.132
The status of NGOs before the ACHPR represents an innovation in how to
grant legal personality to NGOs within intergovernmental organizations. Other
regional bodies—or even the U.N.—might consider using the African Court’s
approach to NGOs as a model for instituting their own procedures granting legal
personality to NGOs. Perhaps, just as the historical movement for legal
personality shifted to the Council of Europe in the mid-twentieth century, the
atmosphere of the twenty-first century also requires regional innovation before
more global innovation takes hold. Amendments to regional instruments to
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provide NGOs legal personality and to grant tribunals the jurisdiction required to
hear cases between NGOs and states may be the best approach to protecting the
efficacy of NGOs and their role within international governance. NGOs could
then point to the effectiveness of these regional approaches when advocating for
a similar approach, or at least broader rights, within the U.N.
Unfortunately, the initial step of determining which NGOs should be
granted observer status hamstrings the efficacy of the African system. Because
only those organizations that have observer status can bring claims before the
ACHPR, the Commission that accepts applications for observer status serves an
important gatekeeping function. The existence of a gatekeeping function, through
requisite criteria and a registry, is often regarded as an important element of any
system that intends to grant legal personality for NGOs. It is, therefore, not
surprising that legal personality is contingent upon observer status. However, as
with ECOSOC, there are worrisome implications when applications for observer
status are seemingly denied for political reasons.
For example, in 2018, the Commission stripped the Coalition of African
Lesbians (CAL) of its observer status following a decision of the African Union
Executive Council that “called on the ACHPR to consider ‘African values’” when
determining NGO status.133 The ACHPR stripped CAL of its observer status after
ten years of conflict with them. This dynamic illustrates a complication within
NGOs’ quest for legal personality in the international realm. Namely, the same
political forces that thwart NGOs on a domestic level may simply thwart them at
an international level as well, given the role of state actors in international
governance. This is one reason a solution within the U.N. may be preferable to a
regional system. A universal system, especially a registry run by a non-state
organization, might protect NGOs from regional or nationwide political bias.
Then, the U.N. could focus more on general criteria like accountability and
legitimacy than domestic political attitudes.

D. Challenges to Legal Personality for NGOs
As the historical movement for legal personality for NGOs suggests,
“international agreements on the legal personality of NGOs seem to advance only
slowly.”134 Thus, a primary challenge to legal personality for NGOs is catalyzing
the NGO community and the international community to invest in change. For
example, in 1972 “Wilfred Jenks observed . . . that ‘[w]hile the number,
importance, and influence of international associations have continued to
133
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increase, the problem of their legal status has not become of such acuteness and
urgency as to make a comprehensive solution oft imperative.’”135 This perspective
remains forceful today. However, the domestic restrictions discussed in this
Comment introduce a degree of “urgency,” and may serve as a catalyst for NGOs
to organize for a renewed push for legal personality. It remains to be seen whether
NGOs will respond to domestic restrictions by organizing for legal personality.
Additionally, most international legal scholars and NGO advocates have
traditionally regarded the quest for legal personality as advantageous to NGOs,
but not to states. Therefore, both in the past and today, NGOs have pushed for
legal personality without powerful state actors to serve as allies.136 This, of course,
raises an immense challenge for accomplishing legal change. While NGOs may
play a key role in the formation of international law, they do so with the support
of state actors and within the structures of inter-governmental organizations.
Attaining legal personality will require similar support from state actors and
institutions. Notably, the “initial quest” for legal personality came under scrutiny
because the proposals by the International Law Association and other bodies
failed to provide solutions to the “problems of registration, control and order.”137
These problems represent the anxieties that states have about expanding NGO
rights: how will those rights be limited and contained in an orderly fashion? As
argued above, modern technology and the increased visibility of NGOs would
likely mitigate these problems, thus protecting modern proposals from the same
sort of criticism. However, NGOs should seek state allies to support any renewed
proposals for legal personality. For example, states that have made public
comments denouncing restrictive legislation in countries like China and Russia
may be more amenable to the idea of protecting NGOs through legal personality
and the concomitant right to bring disputes before international tribunals.138
The diversity among NGOs poses an additional problem for achieving legal
personality. While “there may be a tendency to think of NGOs as a monolithic
collective, individual organizations vary considerably. The interests of NGOs vary
widely.”139 Professor Jenkins describes multiple ways in which NGOs are diverse:
NGOs may provide direct basic services, organize communities to formulate
solutions to problems, or advocate the implementation of particular policies.
They focus on a wide range of activities and differ in their organizational
135
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structures and sources of support. Most NGOs receive funding from one or
more sources, including donations, grants, contracts, fees for services,
product sales, and membership dues. They may be centrally organized or
loosely affiliated through federation structures. In general, this large and
diverse universe of organizations operates at local, national, and international
levels.140

This analysis sheds some light on the difficulty of uniting NGOs around legal
personality. Their different characteristics lead to a diverse set of goals.
Beyond diversity, there is also the problem of motivating NGOs to expend
lobbying power and funds for legal personality when they may not feel their
interests require legal personality. Professor Ben-Ari has argued that such
indifference provides a hurdle to legal personality for NGOs:
It is highly significant that, generally, members of the INGO community have
shown considerable indifference toward the recurring attempts to achieve
formal recognition for their legal position. . . . [A]lthough most of the
important proposals were indeed initiated by INGO forums, the INGO
community, as a whole, has almost completely ignored these attempts.
Evidently, even with their impressive capacity for networking, lobbying, and
media manipulation, INGO activists were simply reluctant to invest their
resources or to cooperate on this matter.141

This indifference on the part of NGOs may be best described as wariness.
Throughout the historical movement for legal personality for NGOs, a recurring
tension arose related to the advantages and disadvantages of legal personality for
the NGOs themselves. On the one hand, legal personality “may help prevent
interstate conflicts and, in the words of the 1923 draft convention, may further
‘the general interest of the international community to encourage the development
of non profit-making international associations.’”142
However, “[o]n the other hand, states have worried that granting
international recognition to NGOs may reduce governmental control over them,
and NGOs have worried that such recognition might entail a loss of autonomy.”143
After all, legal personality involves both the right to sue and be sued. While NGOs
are already responsible for following domestic law and regulations, the ability to
be sued in international tribunals may push some NGOs to avoid legal personality
altogether. Given this dynamic, alongside the “increased attention to NGO
(mis)behavior in recent years” it is possible that “a new treaty would more likely
140
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impose regulation on NGOs than facilitate freedom of association.”144 Therein
lies a difficult balance for achieving legal personality.
As previously mentioned, NGOs will not be able to attain legal personality
without the support of state actors and state actors will not wish to support legal
personality without imposing some requirements on NGOs. Because neither
group of entities can predict where the balance between the two options (legal
rights versus duties of NGOs) will lie, there is a risk in even opening the
conversation. If NGOs seek legal personality at a time when state actors are
hostile to the very idea, NGOs may face backlash or a tightening of their current
role in international governance. Further, states could respond to an NGO-led
movement for legal personality by tightening control over NGO behavior within
their borders. For example, additional states could implement restrictive domestic
legislation against NGOs. Until NGOs succeed in organizing for legal personality,
there is very little they could do in response to such tightening.
This balancing act leads to a final key challenge to legal personality for
NGOs: establishing legitimacy and accountability among NGOs in a way that
would justify a grant of legal rights. It is important to remember that NGOs are
“not by necessity altruistic and not always a force for good.”145 This is not a bar
against legal personality in itself; individuals, states, corporations, and other
entities with legal personality are not necessarily a force for good either. However,
the possibility of bad actors raises questions for legitimacy and accountability that
must be addressed when considering the rights and duties that would be inherent
in granting legal personality to NGOs. Jurij Daniel Aston, University of Bonn, has
argued that:
NGO representatives are at most . . . only accountable to the members of the
NGO on whose behalf they are acting. To put it bluntly, if a society does not
want the government it has elected to advocate certain positions, it can vote
it out of office. This system of democratic control does not function with
respect to NGOs, though. There is no contrat social between society and
NGOs.146

The lack of democratic control of NGOs suggests that a central registry that
can track NGO funding or activities on the ground may be a necessary
requirement before granting legal personality. The connection between a central
registry and legal personality status is not immediately apparent. Legal personality
does not require that there be a registry and accountability mechanism outside of
the courts. In fact, one might argue that the grant of legal personality is in itself a
step toward accountability: giving states the power to sue NGOs for abuse of their
role or funding in international courts could be one effect of legal personality that
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encourages accountability. Further, many parties with legal personality commonly
sued in domestic courts, such as corporations, are not democratically governed.
However, given that states have historically been hesitant to grant other entities
legal personality out of fear that it might impact their power in the international
system, a central registry might ease their concerns. Notably, anti-NGO criticism
has been lobbed from both the left and right ends of the political spectrum.147
Thus, it is implausible to imagine that states would allow all NGOs access to
international tribunals. This then raises the question of just what sort of
requirements states would erect for inclusion in the central registry. Therefore,
part of the discussion around legal personality should address baseline
requirements for organizations that seek classification as an NGO with legal
personality.
While creating and maintaining a registry, which would likely include
reporting requirements for NGOs, is certainly a logistical challenge, it should not
be regarded as insurmountable. Indeed, NGOs are no strangers to reporting
requirements. Even under the current legal framework, once an NGO gains
consultative status with ECOSOC, it is “under an obligation to submit every four
years a report on its activities, the so-called quadrennial report.”148 This is just one
example of current reporting requirements. Domestic regulations, requirements
from funding agencies, or requirements by other international governmental
organizations may compound NGO reporting requirements. As such, while an
important consideration, the likely requirement of a central agency for NGOs
should not be seen as a bar on legal personality altogether.

VI. C ONCLUSION
This Comment argues that the international legal system should use its
preexisting mechanisms to grant NGOs legal personality so that they may combat
domestic restrictions that impede their ability to serve as watchdogs for
international legal agreements. In doing so, the Comment acknowledges that there
are major hurdles standing in the way of legal personality for NGOs. Nonetheless,
NGOs have gained legitimacy in international governance and serve important
roles for the vitality of the system. NGOs already play a formalized role in the
U.N. through Article 71 consultative status. NGOs should consider organizing to
expand their role in the U.N. so as to take steps towards gaining legal personality.
Regional institutions such as the ACHPR offer another promising solution for
NGOs. While the ACHPR’s system is not perfect, it offers a model that other
regional institutions should consider adopting.
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Changes to the U.N. structure and to regional institutions to grant NGOs
legal personality would promote NGO activity by giving them confidence when
making investments and establishing operations within countries. This is because
NGOs could do so with less fear that the domestic government might turn against
them and require them to shut their doors. When entities have the ability to sue
and be sued, they can both hold states accountable and are incentivized to hold
themselves accountable as well. NGOs, especially those that serve as watchdogs
of governments or provide services to communities in need, serve the
international community by ensuring that states abide by their international
commitments and by providing stability in struggling nations. Given the current
onslaught of legislation designed to restrict NGO activities, the time is ripe for
NGOs to mobilize for legal personality.
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